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AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS:
ARE ALL COUNTRIES TREATED EQUALLY?
Justin S. Gruenberg*
This Note argues that the Security Council fails to treat all Members of the United Nations equally, specifically singling out Israel, and to a
lesser extent South Africa, for disparate treatment during the Cold War
period. After introducing the Security Council, the Note creates a hierarchical classification system of wording in Security Council resolutions, specifically of emotive and instructive wording. Once the system is explained,
the Note analyzes the words used in each Security Council resolution and
cross-references those words with the Entity being discussed. To do this, the
Note focuses on nine specific areas in which the disparate treatment among
Members is evident, particularly with regards to Israel. The Note concludes
by stressing the importance of correcting the underlying endemic flaws in
the United Nations system rather than trying to patch problems with artificial devices, such as the Negroponte Doctrine. Only by ridding the Security
Council of its biases can it serve the purpose it was created to fulfill.
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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Security Council, created as a bastion of hope
and international cooperation to contain and resolve threats to international
peace and security around the world, has evolved into a political body
whose resolutions are used to threaten and inequitably treat its Member
countries. The unequal treatment strikes at the very core of the United Nations’ purpose and trivializes the value of international cooperation. Specifically, Israel—and to a lesser extent South Africa—has been uniquely and
excessively singled out for admonishment by the Security Council,
especially when comparing incidents with those committed by
other countries.
To understand the importance of the Security Council and
the role it plays in the United Nations, it is necessary to examine the
purpose the United Nations was
created to serve and how the Security Council fails to uphold the
ideals and objectives of its founders and Member countries. On June
26, 1945, fifty-one countries met in
San Francisco, California and
signed the United Nations Charter.1
Following the victory over the
Axis Powers in World War II, the victorious alliance of countries sought to
1

LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
WORLD POLITICS 22–23 (3d ed. 2000).

AND
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maintain the cooperation that had proven so valuable in World War II.2 The
victors resolved to maintain the alliance and create the United Nations organization.3 Collectively they declared, “[w]e the peoples of the United
Nations [are] determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of
men and women and of nations large and small . . . .”4 To emphasize its
purpose, the Charter continues, “[t]he Organization is based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”5 In layman’s terms, the United
Nations aspired to treat every country and its people equally.
The founding countries were filled with excitement at the thought
of an international organization that would support their interests.6 The
United Nations was created as “humankind’s best hope for an enduring
peace” and “promised a cooperative grouping of nations.”7 In the absence of
a worldwide government,8 treaties provide the best method for diminishing
conflicts between countries.9 Its founders believed the United Nations Charter was such a treaty.10
Unfortunately, since its creation, the United Nations has not lived
up to the lofty visions of its founders nor to the expectations of those that
joined after its creation. The practices of the organization are often contradictory to the principles espoused by the Charter. The founding states of the
United Nations called for “the principle of equal rights” for all its Members,11 but that principle has been ignored. Instead, Members of the United
Nations generally place politics above their goal of preventing conflicts.
Each body of the United Nations has flaws that are consistently exploited by
powerful Members or blocs in order to discriminate against other countries.
In the Security Council, the manipulated flaw is manifest in the ability of
each of the five Permanent Members to veto any resolution it does not agree

2

Id. at 19.
Id.
4
U.N. Charter pmbl. (emphasis added).
5
Id. art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added).
6
ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
7
Id. at 2.
8
This impractical option would necessarily impinge on the sovereignty of each state,
which goes against the principles of the United Nations. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (“The
Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”) (emphasis added).
9
See ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
10
See id.
11
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
3
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with.12 This provides blanket immunity in the Security Council to each of
these countries and any close ally that country wishes to protect.
Conversely, in the General Assembly where every country has an
equal vote and no country is capable of vetoing any proposal, groups of
countries often band together as “blocs” to vote in predetermined ways so as
to strongly influence each vote.13 It is mathematically possible for a resolution in the General Assembly to be passed with a two-thirds vote by countries that make up less that 15 percent of the world’s population.14 Due to
the heavy influences imposed by large blocs, General Assembly resolutions
can single out specific countries excessively.15 Figure 1 shows the General
Assembly’s fixation on resolutions regarding countries in the Middle East.16
The General Assembly’s fixation on Israel and the Middle East conflict has
many possible explanations, including the United States’ consistent protection of Israel in the Security Council,17 an automatic majority in the General
Assembly composed of Israel’s enemies,18 or just a general bias against
Israel.19
Regrettably, this anti-Israel bias is not confined to the General Assembly; it is endemic throughout the United Nations. This disheartening
12

Thomas Bruha, Security Council, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES & PRACTICE
1147, 1152 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1995).
13
See THOMAS HOVET, JR., BLOC POLITICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS 8 (1960). Although
countries informally joined together to support common policies, before 1960, the only true
bloc in its technical sense was “the Soviet bloc, which to all intents and purposes operates as
a single unit with nine votes, the number of its members.” Id. at 30–31.
14
ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 85. See also id. at 94 (explaining the voting power of the
Group of 77, which possesses the strength to defeat all opposition in the General Assembly);
Christoph Schreuer, Regionalization, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND PRACTICE
1059, 1060 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1995) (declaring the Group of 77 to be among the most
influential of the regional groups).
15
For example, the General Assembly annually adopts resolutions stating that Israel “is
not a peace-loving Member State” and calling on “all Member States to cease forthwith,
individually and collectively, all dealings with Israel in order totally to isolate it in all fields.”
HARRIS OKUN SCHOENBERG, A MANDATE FOR TERROR: THE UNITED NATIONS & THE PLO
270–71 (1988).
16
It is important to note that “[n]o [General] Assembly resolution has ever singled out the
Palestinians for criticism.” Michael J. Jordan, Symbolic Fight for Israel at UN, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 8, 2003, at 6.
17
See David A. Bosworth, American Crusade: The Religious Roots of the War on Terror,
7 BARRY L. REV. 65, 86 n.151 (2006).
18
David L. Breau, The World Court’s Advisory Function: “Not Legally Well-Founded,”
14 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 201–02 (2006).
19
Michael Curtis, International Law and the Territories, 32 HARV. INT’L L. J. 457, 473
(1991). The flaws of the General Assembly require a deep investigation of their own. This
idea is briefly introduced here only as another example of the fallibility of the United Nations
organization so as not to imply that the Security Council is the only body that is hijacked by
Members for political purposes.
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conclusion was volunteered by the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi
Annan, in his opening address to the sixty-first session of the General Assembly. Annan admitted, “supporters of Israel feel that it is harshly judged,
by standards that are not applied to its enemies—and too often this is true,
particularly in some UN bodies.”20 The United Nations’ failure to treat all
of its Members equally, the very precept the international organization was
founded upon, is consistently demonstrated by its treatment of Israel.21 This
Note explores the depths of that disparate treatment.
Section II of this Note describes the methodology used to compile
the data presented here. This section explains which types of statistics were
recorded and how the data were chosen.
Section III introduces the Security Council. This section begins by
describing the structure, methods, and purposes of the Council. It continues
by introducing the role regional groups play in the Security Council and
how Israel’s exclusion from the regional group structure violates the United
Nations Charter. The section concludes with an explanation of Security
Council resolutions.
Section IV presents a hierarchical classification system of the words
used in Security Council resolutions. This section explains the ranking of
emotive words, instructive words, and modifying words through examples,
definitions, and their placement in resolutions.
Finally, section V analyzes Security Council resolution wording
based on the classification system created in Section IV. This section begins
by distinguishing between resolutions of the Cold War era, in which the
Security Council excessively focused on Israel and South Africa, and the
resolutions of the post-Cold War era. It continues by comparing the words
used in Israel-centric resolutions with resolutions about other Middle Eastern Entities when both countries engaged in similar behaviors. This section
then explores the Security Council’s focus on South Africa’s apartheid regime. It concludes with a brief discussion of the Negroponte Doctrine, how
it has affected the balance of the wording used in Security Council resolutions, and future implications.
II. METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY
Since its inception, the Security Council has debated thousands of
issues—referred to here as “Subjects”—and has published almost eighteen
20

The Secretary-General, Struggle to Confront Three Global Challenges - Development,
Security, Human Rights, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10643 (Sep.
19, 2006) (emphasis added).
21
H.R. Res. 624, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted). The United Nations’ unequal treatment of
Members is most clearly and repeatedly evidenced in the treatment of Israel, discussed infra,
Section V.B.
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hundred resolutions.22 Certain Subjects have inspired hundreds of resolutions,23 while other comparably important Subjects have inspired very few
or no resolutions.24 This Note focuses on the words used by the United Nations Security Council in resolutions that pertain to each Subject it has addressed. I compared the wording used by the Security Council in resolutions
that were directed toward different Entities when the Subjects were similar.
Since the Subject of a resolution does not always relate to the actions of a
country—sometimes, instead of a country, the Council addresses a non-state
actor—this Note refers to the target of the each Security Council resolution
as an “Entity.” I also compared factually similar Subjects regarding different Entities when only one of the Subjects produced a Security Council resolution.25
I analyzed every Security Council resolution and recorded statistics
in three areas: (1) the wording used; (2) the details employed; and (3) the
frequency of the resolutions. Since the Security Council has considered
hundreds of Subjects over the last sixty-three years, I focused on the Subjects discussed in this Note for one or more of the following reasons: (A)
the Security Council spent a large amount of its time considering the Subject; (B) the Security Council spent very little of its time considering the
Subject, but it resulted in numerous fatalities; (C) the Security Council used
poignant word choices in describing the Subject; or (D) the Security Council used contrasting wording in describing analogous Subjects.
After cross-referencing the Subject of each resolution with both the
Entity and the wording, details and frequency data described above, I performed a content analysis on the statistics collected.26 Content analysis is “a
research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively
identifying specified characteristics within a text.”27 To perform this type of

22

S.C. Res. 1794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1794 (Dec. 21, 2007).
For example, Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was the Subject of twenty-five Security
Council resolutions between August 2, 1990 and October 11, 1991. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 715,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/715 (Oct. 11, 1991); S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (Aug. 2, 1990).
24
For example, due to the Permanent Members’ involvement in the Vietnamese Civil
War, the Security Council did not produce a single resolution on the conflict. ROBERT F.
GORMAN, GREAT DEBATES AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FIFTY KEY ISSUES,
1945–2000, at 174 (2001).
25
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 681, U.N. Doc. S/RES/681 (Dec. 20, 1990) (describing Israel’s
deportation of Palestinians); DAVID W. LESCH, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A HISTORY 236
(2008) (discussing the “Black September” civil war in Jordan in which Palestinians were
killed and exiled). For additional examples, see infra, Section V.B.3.
26
As of the date of this Note, no one has ever attempted to analyze the wording of Security Council resolutions by means of a content analysis or in any other manner.
27
PHILIP J. STONE ET AL., THE GENERAL INQUIRER: A COMPUTER APPROACH TO CONTENT
ANALYSIS 5 (1966). For a thorough explanation of content analysis and its history, see Klaus
23
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analysis, the researcher must create a classification structure by which to
compare the data.28 The classification system used here is intricately described in Section IV.
III. THE SECURITY COUNCIL
A.

Background

Before hierarchically classifying and explaining the wording used
in Security Council resolutions, it is important to understand how the Security Council works. The Security Council is one of six principal organs
created by the United Nations Charter.29 The other enumerated bodies include the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat.30 The
principal responsibility of the Security Council is to maintain international
peace and security.31 Fifteen Members sit on the Security Council; five are
Permanent Members and the other ten are elected by the General Assembly
every two years.32 The five Permanent Members are the People’s Republic
of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union),
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.33 When the two year term of a non-Permanent Member
concludes, it is not eligible to be immediately re-elected.34 This gives a variety of countries the opportunity to participate in Security Council decisions, which is a very prestigious honor.35
Although meetings of the Security Council are not fixed, the Charter requires that the Security Council meet at least every fourteen days.36 A
meeting may be called for a variety of reasons other than the mandatory
Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology, in 5 SAGE COMMTEXT
SERIES 13–20 (F. Gerald Kline ed., 1980).
28
Id. at 27. Each system of content analysis, while performed objectively, is created by the
individual analyst and, thus, subject to the perspective of the analyst. Id. at 26. However, by
clearly enumerating the method used to compile and analyze the data, the data is replicable
and valid inferences can be made from their context. Id. at 21.
29
U.N. Charter art. 7, para. 1.
30
Id.
31
Id. art. 24, para. 1–2.
32
Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/520/Rev.15 (1985).
33
U.N. Charter art. 23, para. 1. Following its collapse, the Soviet Union was replaced on
the Security Council by Russia. The original Republic of China, a founding Member of the
United Nations, was officially replaced in 1971 by the People’s Republic of China under the
United Nations’ One China policy.
34
Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, supra note 32, at 144.
35
ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 50.
36
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7
(1983).
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time period: a request by a Member of the Security Council, a request from
the General Assembly or the Secretary General, a circumstance dictated by
the United Nations Charter, or an initiative by the President of the Security
Council.37 At these meetings, any Member whose interests are affected by
the topic being discussed in the Security Council has the right to participate
in the discussion.38 Furthermore, any state or group—regardless of whether
it is a Member of the United Nations—must be invited to any discussion of
a dispute to which it is a party.39 However, neither of these rights provides
the invited guest a vote in the Security Council’s final decision on the dispute.40
Although maintaining international peace and security is now considered to be solely within the dominion of the Security Council, this structure was not the only proposal.41 During the formation of the United Nations
Charter at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in
June of 1945, several proposals were presented that would have allowed the
General Assembly to play an integral role in preserving international peace
and security.42 One possibility would have mandated that all decisions of the
Security Council be submitted to the General Assembly for ratification;
however, that suggestion was judged to be too cumbersome and likely to
inhibit decisive actions by the Security Council.43 The idea of giving the
General Assembly a strong hand in Security Council proceedings was eventually rejected because the General Assembly already affects the Security
Council by electing the majority of its Members.44
37

Id. at 1–3; ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 51.
Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council, supra note 36, at 37; U.N.
Charter art. 31; ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 51.
39
U.N. Charter art. 32; ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 51.
40
U.N. Charter art. 31–32; ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 51. Giving parties to the dispute
a vote would provide a vote to an unelected or non-Permanent Member of the United Nations, in contravention to the Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 23. Additionally, even if it was
not in breach of the Charter, it would presumably add one vote to each side and make it more
difficult to reach a supermajority of 60 percent of the Security Council required to approve a
resolution. A supermajority requiring nine of fifteen is 60 percent approval. If a supermajority of 60 percent is needed from seventeen votes, eleven votes would be required for approval, since ten votes would only be 58 percent.
41
David Schweigman, The Authority of the Security Council Under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter: Legal Limits and the Role of the International Court of Justice, in 8 STUDIES AND
MATERIALS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 27 (Peter Malanczuk ed.,
2001).
42
Id. at 26–27.
43
Id. at 27 (citing Report of Paul-Boncour, 11 UNCIO DOCS., at 14). Adding another step
to the process of decision-making in order to protect international peace and security would
inhibit the ability to react quickly to any challenges that arise.
44
Id.
38
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The General Assembly elects a majority of the Members to the Security Council, but the Permanent Members have a crucial advantage over
the elected Members: a veto.45 Any Permanent Member can veto any resolution proposed in the Security Council without explanation.46 Often, a Permanent Member uses the veto to protect an ally; thus, the veto is an “instrument of political protectionism.”47 The ability to veto, or even just the
threat of a veto, has had a large impact on the productivity of the Security
Council.48
While there are only five individual vetoes on the Security Council—one available for each Permanent Member—no Permanent Member is
capable of compelling a non-Permanent Member into agreeing to a resolution or declaration.49 Technically, any seven non-Permanent Members banding together have a cumulative veto because a super-majority of nine out of
fifteen votes must approve every resolution.50 This theoretical nonPermanent Member veto is not often discussed because it has never occurred and many consider it implausible that seven divergent states with
different interests would join together to block a resolution; however, it
remains a possibility that the Permanent Members cannot ignore.51
B.

Regional Groups

Regional groups play a very important role in the United Nations,
especially in the Security Council.52 A regional group is a collection of
45

Bruha, supra note 12, at 1152.
Id. For the history of the negotiations over the Permanent Member veto, see STANLEY
MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 9–19 (1995).
47
Bruha, supra note 12, at 1156–57.
48
David M. Malone, Security Council in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED
NATIONS 117, 120 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007) (explaining that during the
Cold War, due to the veto, many “key challenges to international peace and security” were
ignored, some of which included the Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Prague
Spring, and the Vietnam War). For a discussion of the Permanent Member veto, see infra
notes 164–174 and accompanying text.
49
See Bruha, supra note 12, at 1153.
50
Id. To demonstrate, if the five Permanent Members agree that any country with more
than 60,000,000 citizens should never be asked to supply any of its own citizens for United
Nations peace-keeping operations, then seven non-Permanent Members can prevent the
resolution from being approved. Panama, Vietnam, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica,
Libya and Croatia—each with less than 15,000,000 citizens and a seat on the Security Council in 2008—would likely be strongly opposed to this resolution and, thus, capable of banding together to veto that resolution.
51
Id.
52
Robert Jennings, Opinion Regarding The Exclusion of Israel from the United Nations
Regional
Group
System,
¶
3
(Nov.
4
1999)
available
at
http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/222.pdf (“[R]egional groups . . . [are] an essential part of the whole working structure of the Organisation.”).
46
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countries that “control elections to UN-related positions, dividing up the pie
on the basis of geographic representation, as well as coordinate substantive
policy, and form common fronts for negotiations.”53 Each non-Permanent
Member of the Security Council is elected within its own regional group.54
Five non-Permanent Members are selected by the Asia and Africa groups,
one by Eastern Europe, two by Latin America, and two by Western European and Others (WEOG).55 This distribution, which is “proportional to the
geographical and political situation of the members, is intended to assure
the widest possible participation in the power concentration of the Security
Council, as well as the representation of the most particular interests of all
[M]ember states.”56 These non-Permanent Members fill the majority of
seats on the Security Council, thereby substantially affecting the agenda and
resolutions.
The United Nations Charter explicitly states that non-Permanent
Members of the Security Council are selected with regard to their contributions toward the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as
an equitable geographical distribution.57 The use of regional groups for appointing non-Permanent Members prevents countries from banding together
to fill each position. For example, in the General Assembly, the Group of 77
has the strength to defeat all opposition.58 If the General Assembly at large
was tasked with electing all ten non-Permanent Members of the Security
Council without the restrictions of regional groups, the Group of 77 could
always control which ten countries would serve on the Security Council.59
53

EYE
ON
THE
UN,
POLITICAL
ALLIANCES
WITHIN
THE
UN,
http://www.eyeontheun.com/view.asp?l=11&p=55 (last visited Aug. 2, 2008).
54
ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 50.
55
G.A. Res. 1991 (XVIII), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 17, 1963).
56
Bruha, supra note 12, at 1151.
57
ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 49.
58
Id. at 94. The Group of 77 was created “to articulate and promote [the groups’] collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international
economic issues within the United Nations system . . . .” THE GROUP OF 77, ABOUT THE
GROUP OF 77, http://www.g77.org/doc. As of 2008, 130 countries comprised the Group of 77.
THE GROUP OF 77, MEMBER STATES, http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html. Originally
founded in 1964 at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the
group has almost doubled in size since its creation. Mir A. Ferdowsi, Group of 77 and the
UN in A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS 154, 154 (Helmut Volger ed.,
2002). Since it is single-handedly able to control the majority of the General Assembly, the
Group of 77 is among the most influential of the regional groups. Schreuer, supra note 14, at
1060.
59
This example is set forth as a demonstration of what could theoretically occur if regional groups were not involved in the process of appointing non-Permanent Members of the
Security Council. This example does not evaluate the probability of whether an issue specific
group—such as the Group of 77 and its focus on economic issues—could come to a consensus on such a far reaching and broad decision.
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Chapter VIII of the Charter discusses the role regional groups play
in the United Nations and how they relate to the Security Council.60 In determining what countries comprise a regional group, geography, political
affiliation, economic development, and other considerations must each be
taken into account.61 The United Nations’ use of regional groups is based
upon
[a] recognition by participating governments that not all problems are either national or global in scope. Some international problems may be confined to a geographic region; their solutions may require action by only a
limited number of states, or psychological, technical, or administrative difficulties may limit the ability of international agencies to function beyond
the region. International regionalism exists, therefore, because groups of
states have found it to be the most appropriate means of solving some
common problems.62

In practice, the function of a regional group in the General Assembly is comparable to that of a political party in a parliamentary democracy,
making the United Nations’ body more efficient.63 Like political parties, the
groups often develop “common positions on important agenda items” so as
to agree on how a unified vote should be carried out.64
Although regional group participation is not mandatory, only two
countries—Israel and the United States—are not a part of the regional group
structure.65 The United States voluntarily chooses not to partake in WEOG,
except for electoral matters.66 Due to its immense political influence, America is able to refuse any responsibilities that may be required of other members in a regional group and use the group only for electing United Nations
representatives. In contrast, for over forty years, Israel has been consistently
denied membership in the Asian group due to refusal by the Arab League.67
Finally, in 2000, Israel was invited into the WEOG, but only on a temporary
basis.68 As a result of its restricted status, Israel is not permitted to partake
60

U.N. Charter art. 52–54.
Schreuer, supra note 14, at 1059.
62
ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 31.
63
Schreuer, supra note 14, at 1060.
64
Id.
65
ZIRING ET AL., supra note 1, at 91.
66
Id. Despite its name, the WEOG is the only regional group that is not based on geographical location of a group; instead it serves as a group for politically aligned countries.
67
See Barbara Crossette, Israel's Bittersweet Moment: One Step Out of Isolation at U.N.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at A6. Israel was the only country denied from joining its geographical regional group. EYE ON THE UN, supra note 53.
68
Crossette, supra note 67; EYE ON THE UN, supra note 53. In 2004, Israel’s participation
in the WEOG was approved for indefinite extension, but it has yet to be permanently admitted. H.R. Res. 624, supra note 21.
61
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in any group activities or deliberations outside of the United States.69 While
the headquarters of the United Nations is located in New York, the three
other important WEOG offices—the European headquarters in Geneva, and
offices in Vienna and Nairobi—are not open to Israeli representatives.70
These limitations, which are not placed upon any other Members of the
United Nations, are far more than just symbolic restrictions on Israel.
For example, Israel is prevented from caucusing in Geneva, where
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights is headquartered,71 a
committee renowned for its extensive focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict.72
The Commission, long criticized as an ineffective body that ignored the
human rights violations of its members, was, in effect, replaced by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2006.73 Despite the change in name
and structure, the successor Council continues to inordinately focus on the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Even the President of the new Human Rights Council
has explicitly stated that the Council has failed with respect to the ArabIsraeli conflict.74 This is just one example of a United Nations organ that
Israel is denied access to participate in as a restricted member of the
WEOG.
In 1999, Israel’s exclusion from the regional group structure of the
United Nations was comprehensively condemned by Sir Robert Jennings,
former President of the International Court of Justice and noted judge. He
declared that Israel’s “rights as a Member of the United Nations to participate in the work of the United Nations are largely nullified by its exclusion
from membership [in] a regional group.”75 This exclusion was “manifestly
unlawful and constitutes a breach of both the letter and the spirit of the
Charter of the United Nations.”76 Although he wrote this position paper
before Israel was temporarily admitted to the WEOG, Jennings would likely
agree that Israel’s current limitations—its non-permanent admission to
WEOG and inability to participate outside of America—still prevent it from
69

Crossette, supra note 67.
Ruth Wedgwood, Recent Books on International Law: Book Review, 99 A.J.I.L 284,
285 n.6 (2005); H.R. Res. 624, supra note 21.
71
Crossette, supra note 67.
72
Id.
73
Morton H. Halperin & Diane F. Orentlicher, The New UN Human Rights Council, 13
No. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF. 1, 1 (2006). The Council is elected by the General Assembly, thereby making the Council members accountable to the entire United Nations for their own countries protection of human rights. Id. at 4. This is a drastic change from the previous body.
74
Stéphane Bussard, International: Au sujet de la Palestine, le Conseil a échoué [About
Palestine, the Council Failed], LE TEMPS (France), Sep. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.letemps.ch/template/print.asp?article=215936.
75
Jennings, supra note 52, ¶ 4.
76
Id.
70
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being treated as equal to other Members of the United Nations. Giving
Israel anything less than “full and equal participation in the work of the
United Nations . . . is a breach by Members of their obligations under the
Charter.”77
C.

Resolutions

The Security Council publishes its determinations through resolutions, presidential statements, or informal press briefings by the President.78
The Charter does not direct any United Nations body to use a particular
form for publication of its decisions, nor does it discuss the legal effect of
these pronouncements. Presidential statements are decisions to which every
Member of the Security Council agrees.79 This form has recently become
more popular and is typically used to express the opinion of the Security
Council where the formality of a resolution is not necessary.80
The most common action of the Security Council is to issue a resolution on the Subject it is currently discussing.81 Although the Charter does
not use the term “resolution,”82 its use stems from the legal history of the
United States and “describes an official expression of opinion of a parliamentary assembly.”83 Since the Charter does not dictate the method by
which the Security Council must publish its determinations, the Members of
the Council decided that resolutions were the optimal mode to announce its
conclusions. Resolutions are “the common legal instrument for an organ or
body to make a recommendation or statement, recall a fact, express an opinion, or undertake any other matter of substance.”84 The importance of Security Council resolutions, combined with their infrequent invocation and

77

Id. ¶ 12.
See Ingo Winkelmann, Security Council, in A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 58, at 497, 501.
79
Stefan Talmon, The Statements by the President of the Security Council, 2 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 419, 419 (2003). Presidential statements are introduced here only so far as to present
the options of the Security Council for publishing its determinations.
80
Anthony Aust, The Procedure and Practice of the Security Council Today, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 365, 370 (Rene-Jean Dupy ed., 1993).
This Note focuses on resolutions rather than other publications due to the importance and
formality associated with them. For an in-depth analysis of Presidential Statements, see
Talmon, supra note 79.
81
Rainer Lagoni, Resolution, Declaration, Decision in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES
AND PRACTICE 1081, 1081 (Rudiger Wolfrum & Christine Philipp eds., 1995).
82
See Bardo Fassbender, Resolution, Declaration, Decision in A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 58, at 473, 475.
83
Id. at 473.
84
Lagoni, supra note 81, at 1081.
78
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extensive vocabulary,85 demonstrates a necessity for creating a hierarchical
classification system from which the Security Council’s choice of words in
resolutions can be given meaning and properly analyzed.
IV. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WORDING
When drafting resolutions, the Security Council uses a cornucopia
of words and phrases to attach particular meanings to its statements. As of
this printing, no other researcher has published a study of the wording used
in Security Council resolutions. The only data compilation in a remotely
related area is a survey of wording in General Assembly resolutions in 1988
by former Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations
Legal Office Blaine Sloan.86 However, Sloan merely counted the incidence
of specific words; he did not classify the words in a hierarchical system, nor
did he consider the variation of words depending on the Subject or Entity at
issue.87 Perhaps the most marked distinction is that Sloan only examined
General Assembly resolutions, which are significantly different from Security Council resolutions.88
In constructing a classification system for content analysis, I focused on three different types of words the Security Council uses, which are
referred to here as emotive words, instructive words, and modifiers. First,
emotive words connote feelings on behalf of the Security Council regarding
the Subject of the resolution. For example, the Security Council has expressed its “concern” 2,793 times in its first 1,794 resolutions. Second, instructive words state the amount of urgency the Security Council attaches to
the action stated in the resolution. These words usually illustrate the influence the Security Council intends to apply to the Entity of the resolution.
For example, the Security Council has “requested” an action 2,793 times.89
Finally, modifiers increase the strength of a word by using an adverb to
amplify the meaning of the word it modifies. For example, “strongly condemns” is an incremental escalation in force from merely “condemns.”90
Neither the United Nations nor the Security Council has created any
definitions or hierarchical classification systems from which targeted Enti85

The United Nations Security Council only published 1794 resolutions in its first sixtytwo years, compared with 11,960 resolutions by the General Assembly during the same
period.
86
BLAINE SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS IN OUR CHANGING
WORLD 9 (1991).
87
Id.
88
Id. For examples of the difference between the General Assembly and the Security
Council, see supra notes 12–20 and accompanying text.
89
“Requested” is less commanding than “demanded.” For the hierarchical classification of
all instructive words, see Section IV.B and Table B.
90
See William Safire, Strongly Condemn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at A23.
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ties or researchers can analyze the Security Council’s word selection. Furthermore, many of the divergent words used are considered synonyms of
each other according to the dictionary, yet appear to convey messages of
different intensities. Consequently, I have scrutinized both the dictionary
definitions of the terms and their context and usage in resolutions. While
this may seem circular in logic, only by determining the context in which
words are used can I analyze their placement in other resolutions. To create
a proper classification system free of preconceived notions, I recorded the
frequency of word choices prior to constructing a hierarchy of the words.
To further clarify this classification system, the words included in
this analysis encompass most of the word choices employed by the Security
Council.91 When reading Security Council resolutions, I searched for the
context the words were used in, and recorded the use of a word only if it
was in accordance with the expression of a feeling. For example, where the
Security Council “[f]urther requests the Secretary-General to submit to the
Council, in consultation with all parties concerned, detailed proposals . . . ,”
I did not include that as an example of when the Security Council was “concerned.”92 Additionally, I searched for the root of each word rather than the
exact form located in Tables A and B. For example, where the Security
Council declared it is “[e]xpressing concern at the increase in crime across
the ceasefire line . . . ,”93 I considered that an occurrence of when the Security Council used the term “concerned.”
A.

Emotive Wording
Table A.

The Security Council uses a
wide vocabulary to describe its institutional feelings towards particular actions. Table A shows the range of emotive words from weakest to strongest.
The most common word used in resolutions, which connotes the feelings of
the Security Council, is “concerned.”
For example, the Security Council
stated it was “[c]oncerned about the
91

Emotive Words
From Weakest to Strongest
Concerned
Grieved
Deplored
Condemned
Alarmed
Shocked
Indignant
Censured

The Security Council uses such a wide vocabulary that the words used here had to be
limited in order to properly analyze them. To do this, I considered words that the Security
Council used more than once and were found in similar Subjects so as to properly rank them
in the classification system. Although this may not be the optimal system, it is the only way
to be able to perform a meaningful analysis of the data.
92
S.C. Res. 1332, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1332 (Dec. 14, 2000) (emphasis added).
93
S.C. Res. 1604, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1604 (June 15, 2005) (emphasis added).
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escalation of politically motivated violence in Haiti at this time of critical
political transition.”94 Webster’s Dictionary defines “concerned” as being
“interested or affected; troubled or anxious.”95 “Concerned” is used 2,793
times in 1,794 resolutions and is the least urgent sentiment; it often indicates
a brewing problem that the Security Council may examine.96
The next strongest word in the spectrum is “grieved.” For example,
the Security Council has asserted that it was “[g]rieved at the tragic loss of
human life, mainly that of civilians.”97 “Grieved” is defined as “to feel or
cause to feel grief.”98 This term has been used twenty-three times by the
Security Council only, but not always, when it states its feelings about the
loss of life or damage to property.99 Typically, use of the word “grieved” is
merely a reflection on past events rather than a word that connotes a continuation of disappointment into the future such as the word “deplore.”100
The word “deplore[d]” has been used by the Security Council 216
times. For example, with respect to the Iran-Iraq War, the Council
“[d]eplor[ed] . . . the bombing of purely civilian population centres, attacks
on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the use of
chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.”101 “Deplored” means “to regret deeply; to disapprove of; censure.”102
To reach the level of “deplore,” the Entity of the resolution must be perceived as violating customary international law in some form. All Security
Council resolutions using the term “deplore” describe Subjects similar to

94

S.C. Res. 867, U.N. Doc. S/RES/867 (Sep. 23, 1993).
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, CLASSIC EDITION 135 (1st ed. 1999) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY].
96
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 259, U.N. Doc. S/RES/259 (Sep. 27, 1968).
97
S.C. Res. 571, U.N. Doc. S/RES/571 (Sep. 20, 1985).
98
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 290. Grief is defined as a cause of keen
distress or sorrow. Id.
99
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 271, U.N. Doc. S/RES/271 (Sep. 15, 1969). (The Security Council is
“[g]rieved at the extensive damage caused by arson to the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on 21 August 1969 under the military occupation of Israel.”).
100
Compare id. with S.C. Res. 259, supra note 96 (“Deploring the delay in the implementation of resolution 237 (1967) because of the conditions still being set by Israel for receiving
a Special Representative of the Secretary-General”).
101
S.C. Res. 598, U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (July 20, 1987).
102
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 176. This definition exemplifies that although the strongest emotive word used by the Security Council, “censure,” is a synonym,
the context and Subjects using the word “deplor[ed]” dictate that “deplor[ed]” falls far lower
on the hierarchical scale.
95
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the Iran-Iraq War example.103 The Security Council also uses “deplore”
when criticizing the destruction of property or loss of lives, although
breaches of international law are often the causes of those results.104 Pulitzer
Prize winner and noted etymologist, William Safire, agrees that “deplored”
is a step below “condemned,” ignoring any modifiers, on the scale of harsh
language employed by the Security Council in its resolutions.105
Of all the emotive words used in Security Council resolutions, the
term “condemn” is probably the most familiar to the public at large.106 It is
the strongest emotive word that is used commonly in Security Council resolutions.107 For example, the Security Council has “[c]ondemn[ed] the apartheid policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa . . . .”108
“Condemn” means “to express strong disapproval of; to sentence to severe
punishment; to pronounce guilty.”109 It is used quite often—623 times—for
a large variety of Subjects that are serious enough to warrant a harsh rebuke
by the Security Council, mostly violations of human rights.110
Next on the hierarchical list are the terms “alarmed” and “shocked.”
Neither of these terms is used very often. For instance, the Security Council
has “[e]xpresse[d] alarm at the violence which took place on 8 October at
the Haram al-Sharif and other Holy Places of Jerusalem resulting in over
twenty Palestinian deaths and the injury of more than one hundred and fifty
people.”111 “Alarmed” means “sudden fear caused by danger; to make fearful.”112 In addition to expressing its outrage over certain Subjects, the Security Council uses “alarmed” to describe the failure of Members to comply
with previous resolutions.113 Once the human rights violations increase in
103

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 108, U.N. Doc. S/RES/108 (Sep. 8, 1955) (“Deploring the recent
outbreak of violence in the area along the armistice demarcation line established between
Egypt and Israel”).
104
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 256, U.N. Doc. S/RES/256 (Aug. 16, 1968) (“Deplores the loss of
life and heavy damage to property”).
105
Safire, supra note 90, at A23.
106
See id.
107
No instructive word that is stronger than “condemn” is used more than ten times by the
Security Council.
108
S.C. Res. 191, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/191 (June 18, 1964).
109
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 136.
110
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 945, U.N. Doc. S/RES/945 (Sep. 29, 1994) (“Condemns any action,
including laying of landmines, which threatens the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian
assistance to all in need in Angola and puts the lives of the humanitarian relief workers at
risk”).
111
S.C. Res. 672, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/672 (Oct. 12, 1990).
112
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 16.
113
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990) (“Gravely alarmed that
Iraq continues to refuse to comply with resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990) and
664 (1990) . . . .”).
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intensity, the Security Council raises the harshness of the wording to
“shocked.” For example, the Security Council was “[s]hocked at the tragic
incident that resulted in the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi
on 6 April 1994.”114 “Shocked” means “a sudden or violent disturbance of
the emotions or sensibilities.”115 It has been used only eight times in Security Council resolutions, seven of which refer to loss of life.116 The combination of both shocked and alarmed has been used only once, to describe an
invasion of a Member by another Member.117
Another seldom used, but powerful word is the term “indignation.”
For example, the Security Council expressed its “[i]ndigna[tion] at the continued executions of freedom fighters by the illegal regime [of Southern
Rhodesia].”118 “Indignation” means “strong displeasure at something considered unjust, offensive, insulting, or base.”119 It has only been used in ten
resolutions, each time referring to a violation of territorial integrity or killings.120
Finally, the word the Security Council uses to indicate its strongest
displeasure is the world “censure.” In 1966, the Security Council
“[c]ensure[d] Israel for [a] large-scale military action in violation of the
United Nations Charter.”121 “Censure” is defined as a “strong disapproval;
to criticize harshly.”122 This word has been used only seven times with regards to an Entity, none since 1982.123 William Safire considers censure to
be very serious chastisement of an action, more serious than a “condemnation.”124 “Censure” is usually used after previous resolutions have been ig-
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S.C. Res. 912, U.N. Doc. S/RES/912 (Apr. 21, 1994).
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 610.
116
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 392, U.N. Doc. S/RES/392 (June 19, 1976) (“Deeply shocked over
large-scale killings and wounding of Africans in South Africa, following the callous shooting
of African people including schoolchildren and students demonstrating against racial discrimination on 16 June 1976”). The only instance the Security Council used “shocked” without a death involved was in describing an assassination attempt. S.C. Res. 471, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/471 (June 5, 1980) (“Shocked by the assassination attempts against the Mayors of
Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh”).
117
S.C. Res. 517, U.N. Doc. S/RES/517 (Aug. 4, 1982) (“Deeply shocked and alarmed by
the deplorable consequences of the Israeli invasion of Beirut on 3 August 1982.”).
118
S.C. Res. 423, U.N. Doc. S/RES/423 (Mar. 14, 1978).
119
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 337.
120
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 568, U.N. Doc. S/RES/568 (June 21, 1985).
121
S.C. Res. 228, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/228 (Nov. 25, 1966).
122
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 105.
123
S.C. Res. 517, supra note 117.
124
See William Safire, On Language; Empowerment and Denouncement, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 1990, at 12.
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nored in combination with another action that violates the Charter.125 Security Council Resolutions 245 and 246 demonstrate the increase of strength
from “condemn” to “censure.” In Resolution 245, the Security Council
“[c]ondemn[ed] the refusal of the Government of South Africa to comply”
with its order to release and repatriate South West Africans.126 The following resolution then “[c]ensur[ed] the Government of South Africa for its
flagrant defiance of Security Council resolution 245.”127 The escalation in
wording of resolutions on this Subject demonstrates that in Security Council
resolutions, “censure” is a stronger emotive word than “condemn.”
B.

Instructive Wording
Table B.

The words that matter most to
Instructive Words
the target of a Security Council resoluFrom Weakest to Strongest
tion are typically the instructive words.
Decide
These words indicate the amount of
Call upon
authority the Security Council intends
Recommend
to convey to the Entity of each resoluRequest
tion in order to make the Entity recogUrge
nize the severity of the Subject. The
Warn
stronger the instructive word, the greater risk an Entity takes by ignoring it. If
Demand
disregarded long enough, the Security
Council may impose sanctions or authorize military engagement.
The gentlest instructive word the Security Council uses is “decides.” For example, the Security Council “[d]ecide[d] to extend the
mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 January 1999.”128 “Decides” means “to solve or
conclude (a dispute) by awarding victory to one side; to make up one’s
mind about; resolve; to come to a decision.”129 “Decides” is different from
other instructive words because it is the only one that does not use a direct
object. Generally, it is used to make a statement on behalf of the Security
Council and it often precedes other instructive words.130 It is the most commonly used word in Security Council resolutions, more than three thousand
125

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 478, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980) (“Censures in the
strongest terms the enactment by Israel of the ‘basic law’ on Jerusalem and the refusal to
comply with relevant Security Council resolutions.”).
126
S.C. Res. 245, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/245 (Jan. 25, 1968).
127
S.C. Res. 246, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/246 (Mar. 14, 1968).
128
S.C. Res. 1215, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1215 (Dec. 17, 1998).
129
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 169.
130
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1215, supra note 128.
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times. Moreover, 960 resolutions conclude with the clause “decides to remain [actively] seized of the matter.”131 That phrase indicates that the Security Council may return to the Subject of that resolution at a future time if
proper actions are not taken by the appropriate Entity.
The weakest instructive phrase that actually instructs a Entity to
perform an action is “calls upon.” The Security Council has “[c]all[ed] upon
all Somali parties, movements and factions to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General in the implementation of [a] resolution.”132 As a phrase,
“calls upon” is not in the dictionary, but the word “call” is defined as “to
summon.”133 This phrase has been used 1357 times.134 In practice, when the
Security Council “calls upon” an Entity to do something, it is asking the
Entity to comply with that clause of the resolution simply as a matter of
principle. Typically, the Subject of that clause of the resolution is not a major human rights violation.135
Another gentle instructive word used by the Security Council is
“recommends.” For example, the Security Council has “[r]ecommend[ed]
that the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments should immediately
refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the
provisions of the Statute of the Court.”136 “Recommends” is defined as “to
urge or suggest as appropriate or beneficial.”137 This word is used almost
exclusively to make suggestions to the United Nations General Assembly,138
or to other bodies.139 The Security Council also “recommends [countries] be
admitted to membership in the United Nations.”140
“Requests” is also a fairly mild instruction. “The Security Council
[has] request[ed] the permanent members of the Security Council to direct
their Chiefs of Staff to meet, or to appoint representatives who shall meet, at
131

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1495, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1495 (July 31, 2003).
S.C. Res. 746, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/746 (Mar. 17, 1992).
133
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 93.
134
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 746, supra note 132.
135
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 965, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/965 (Nov. 30, 1994) (“Calls upon the
international community to provide resources needed to meet the immediate needs of the
Government of Rwanda directly or through the Trust Fund established pursuant to resolution
925 . . . .”).
136
S.C. Res. 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/22 (Apr. 9, 1947).
137
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 553.
138
138 of the 180 times the word is used in a Security Council resolution. See, e.g., S.C.
Res. 1426, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1426 (July 24, 2002) (“Recommends to the General Assembly
that the Swiss Confederation be admitted to membership in the United Nations.”).
139
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1012, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1012 (Aug. 28, 1995) (“Recommends
that the international commission o inquiry be composed of five impartial and internationally
respected, experienced jurists who shall be selected by the Secretary-General and shall be
furnished with adequate expert staff, and the Government of Burundi be duly informed.”).
140
S.C. Res. 374, U.N. Doc. S/RES/374 (Aug. 18, 1975).
132
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London on 1 February 1946.”141 “Requests” means “to ask for; to ask
(someone) to do something.”142 It is one of the most common instructions in
Security Council resolutions, used 2,968 times. The actions “request[ed]”
have varied considerably in substance, but the Security Council “requests”
certain actions more commonly than others.143 For instance, anytime something is asked of the Secretary General, the Security Council “requests” the
action.144
Correspondingly, when asking for something of multiple parties,
the Security Council usually “urges” them to follow the appeal it has made.
The Security Council has “[u]rge[d] the international community to lend its
support to the restructuring of the security forces of the Central African
Republic.”145 “Urges” is defined as “to push along; impel; to try to induce or
persuade.”146 Typically, “urges” is the most definitive word the Security
Council uses to induce an Entity’s compliance with a resolution without
indicating excessive pressure.147
The next most strenuous instruction used by the Security Council is
“warns.” For example, the Security Council has “[w]arn[ed] that the Council will respond appropriately should any [Cambodian party] fail to honor its
obligations” under prior agreements.148 “Warns” is defined as “to give advance notice to; to advise to be careful; admonish.”149 This is an apt definition in that it gives notice to a party not to engage in similar actions in the
future while chastising that party for its current act. When the Security
Council wants to indicate it will not tolerate future transgressions similar to
the current Subject of its resolutions, it “warns” the Entity that repeated
actions will be treated more harshly. The Security Council has only

141

S.C. Res. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 (Jan. 25, 1946)
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 565.
143
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1173, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (June 12, 1998) (“Requests
Member States to provide to the Committee created pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), no
later than 15 July 1998, information on the measures they have adopted to implement the
provisions of paragraphs 11 and 12 above.”).
144
The Security Council has “requested” an action by the Secretary-General 1564 times.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1167, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1167 (May 14, 1998) (“Requests the SecretaryGeneral to keep the Council informed of all significant developments, in particular regarding
the security situation, and also requests him to report within three months of the adoption of
this resolution on its implementation”).
145
S.C. Res. 1230, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1230 (Feb. 26, 1999).
146
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 724.
147
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 727, U.N. Doc. S/RES/727 (Jan. 8, 1992) (“Urges all parties to
honor the commitments made at Geneva and Sarajevo with a view to effecting a complete
cessation of hostilities.”).
148
S.C. Res. 826, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/826 (May 20, 1993).
149
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 743.
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“warned” a party seventeen times and usually only after using a strong emotive word earlier in the resolution. For instance, the Security Council
[c]ondemn[ed] the recent premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on
Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United
Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions, and warn[ed] once again
that if such attacks were to be repeated the Security Council would have to
meet to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such attacks.150

The strongest instructive word commonly used by the Security
Council is “demands.” For example, the Security Council “[d]emand[ed] the
immediate and total cessation of all hostile acts committed against Botswana by the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.”151 “Demands” is defined as
“to ask for with authority; to ask for peremptorily or urgently; to call for or
require; an urgent or pressing requirement.”152 The Security Council is not
shy about “demanding” action; it has “demanded” an action 805 times.
Most commonly, “demands” is used to instruct the Entity or Entities of a
resolution to cease hostilities or fighting.153
C.

Modifiers

The Security Council often uses modifying adverbs to increase the
intensity of an emotive word.154 Examples include “deeply,”155 “gravely,”156
“solemnly,”157 “strongly,”158 “urgently,”159 and “vigorously.”160 The most
common modifier, other than no modifier, is the term “strongly,” used 371
times. The least common modifier is “vigorously,” which is used only three
times, each in conjunction with the term “condemn.”161 Although modifiers
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S.C. Res. 265, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/265 (Apr. 1, 1969) (emphasis added).
S.C. Res. 403, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/403 (Jan. 14, 1977).
152
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 173.
153
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1304, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1304 (June 16, 2000) (“Demands that
Ugandan and Rwandan forces as well as forces of the Congolese armed opposition and other
armed groups immediately and completely withdraw from Kisangani.”).
154
See Safire, supra note 90.
155
“[I]ntense; profound.” WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 95, at 170.
156
“[S]edate or solemn; weighty; momentous; serious; critical.” Id. at 288.
157
“[G]rave; mirthless; serious; earnest.” Id. at 630.
158
“[P]owerful in influence; of great force, effectiveness, or potency.” Id. at 655.
159
“[R]equiring immediate action or attention.” Id. at 724.
160
“[A]ctive strength or force; intensity.” Id. at 734.
161
S.C. Res. 612, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/612 (May 9, 1988) (“Condemns vigorously the
continued use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and
Iraq contrary to the obligations under the Geneva Protocol.”); S.C. Res. 611, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
151
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play a small role in this content analysis, they serve an important role by
incrementally increasing the intensity of a word without requiring the Security Council to use the next strongest emotive word in the hierarchical system.162
V. THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DISPARATE TREATMENT OF ENTITIES
A.

Two Distinct Time Periods

Since the Security Council began considering threats to international peace and security in 1946, the Council has not consistently performed its
task, nor has it used wording in resolutions evenly. The history of the Security Council can easily be split into two distinct periods: Cold War and postCold War.163 During the Cold War period, due to the veto possessed by both
the United States and the Soviet Union, many “challenges to international
peace and security” were not addressed by the Security Council, including
the Berlin Blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Prague Spring, and the
Vietnam War.164 Each of these Subjects involved either the United States or
the Soviet Union. Since neither country would allow itself to be criticized
by the Security Council, each one vetoed resolutions regarding any of these
Subjects, despite the threat to international peace and security each presented.165 Since each Permanent Member had veto power, the Security
Council was usually confined to “operating on the margins of the major
conflicts of its time, often intervening to encourage negotiation, to strengthen cease-fires and to deploy monitors and impartial peacekeeping
forces.”166 From 1946 to 1989, only 646 Security Council resolutions were
issued.167 The Security Council never issued more than thirty resolutions in
a single year before 1990.168
S/RES/611 (Apr. 25, 1988) (“Condemns vigorously the aggression, perpetrated on 16 April
1988 against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Tunisia in flagrant violation of the
Charter of the United Nations, international law and norms of conduct.”); S.C. Res. 573, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985) (“Condemns vigorously the act of armed aggression
perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in flagrant violation of the Charter of the
United Nations, international law and norms of conduct.”).
162
For an illustration of the increase in strength associated with adding the word “strongly”
to an emotive word, see Safire, supra note 90.
163
Malone, supra note 48, at 117.
164
Id. at 120.
165
See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
374–75 (7th ed., Routledge 1997) (1970).
166
Malone, supra note 48, at 117.
167
See S.C. Res. 646, U.N. Doc. S/RES/646 (Dec. 14, 1989).
168
Peter Wallensteen & Patrik Johansson, Security Council Decisions in Perspective in
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 18 (David M.
Malone ed., 2004).
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Figure 2.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, the Security Council was freed from its shackles and able to consider
more issues while using different word choices.169 Since 1990, the Security
Council has issued more than 1,100 resolutions.170 The vocabulary of the
Security Council has changed in the post-Cold War period. Some words
have not been used by the Security Council in resolutions in the post-Cold
War period, such as “grieved” or “censure,” which have not been used since
1986. Other words, such as “alarmed” or “concerned,” are used more frequently in the current time period. Additionally, the breakup of the Soviet
Union had a ripple effect on many other countries in Eastern Europe.171 For
example, the fragmentation of Yugoslavia led to conflicts between warring
factions that has killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions from
their homes.172 The Security Council, free from the constant threat or use of
a veto by a Permanent Member, “displayed an unprecedented activism” in
trying to facilitate peace and security.173 Table C shows the dramatically
different usage of the Permanent Member veto in the two distinct eras.174
169

See Ken Roberts, Second-Guessing the Security Council: The International Court of
Justice and its Powers of Judicial Review, 7 PACE INT’L L. REV. 281, 282 (1995).
170
See S.C. Res. 1784, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1784 (Oct. 31, 2007).
171
See Roger Cohen, End of Cold War Offers Chilling New Dangers, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Nov. 26, 1994, at A15.
172
Id.
173
Roberts, supra note 169, at 283.
174
Malone, supra note 48, at 121.
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Table C.
Resolutions
Percentage of total
Vetoes
Percentage of total
Vetoes by country
USSR/Russia
USA
UK
France
China
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1946-1986 1987-2005175
593
1010
37
63
212
38
85
15
114
54
25
16
3

3
26
5
2
2

This Note uses the start of 1990 as the split between the two eras
due to the drastic change in productivity evidenced by the increased number
of Security Council resolutions.176 The majority of statistics invoked in this
analysis pertains to the Cold War era, when the polarized Security Council
focused extensively on Israel—and to a lesser extent South Africa—while
failing to address most other conflicts.

175

Malone, supra note 48, at 121.
Prior to 1990, the Security Council never published more than twenty-nine resolutions
in any year. From 1990 to 2007, the Security Council averaged more than sixty-three resolutions each year, with a range between thirty-seven and ninety-three resolutions per year. For
graphical depiction of the increase in Security Council resolutions, see Figure 2.
176
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Since the creation of the United Nations, Israel’s actions have been
the Subject of far more resolutions than any other Subject. Prior to 1990,
147 Security Council resolutions dealt with Israel and its actions, which was
more than twenty-three percent of the 646 resolutions issued during that
time frame.177 South Africa was the second most popular Entity referred to
in resolutions during the Cold War era, considered in seventy-six resoluFigure 3.

tions. Of the 646 resolutions of the period, ninety-two merely discussed the
admission of new Members to the United Nations.178 Numerous others
served merely house-keeping purposes.179 These proportions are graphically
displayed in Figure 3. In the post-Cold War era, resolutions concerning
Israel have dropped to less than seven percent of the resolutions issued. Similarly, South Africa was rarely addressed by the Security Council after the
Cold War era because apartheid was already in decline by the end of the
1980s.180 The drastic difference between the two time periods indicates that,
in addition to the Security Council failing to treat its Members equally, it
does not even treat specific Members the same over time.

177

For graphical breakdown of Security Council resolutions in the Cold War era, see Figure 3.
178
Ninety-two resolutions considered admitting new Members, but Security Council Resolution 69 discussed the admission of Israel S.C. Res. 69, U.N. Doc. S/RES/69 (Mar. 4, 1949).
In order to use conservative calculations, which further emphasizes the disparity, Security
Council Resolution 69 was not counted among the 147 Israel-centric resolutions of the Cold
War era, despite the fact that it related to the State of Israel.
179
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 110, U.N. Doc S/RES/110 (Dec. 16., 1955) (stating that, according
to the Charter, the United Nations must hold a conference to review the United Nations Charter).
180
South Africa’s election of F.W. de Klerk as President and his negotiation with Nelson
Mandela began the process of “dismantl[ing] the legislative basis for apartheid.” GORMAN,
supra note 24, at 130.

2009]

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

B.

Entity-Specific Word Choices

1.

The Hebron massacre v. the Park Hotel bombing
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The Security Council does not have a uniform vocabulary; it has
used distinct words in resolutions regarding specific Entities. Comparing the
distinct word choices in Security Council Resolution 904 with Security
Council Resolution 1,402 is the most telling demonstration of the Council’s
proclivity for treating Israel differently than other Entities.181 In 1994, Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish settler living in the Occupied Territories of the
West Bank, entered the Mosque of Ibrahim in the city of Hebron and killed
twenty-nine Muslims while they were praying.182 Another 125 Muslims
were wounded in the gruesome attack.183 The mayor of Hebron, Mustafa
Natshe, acknowledged that Goldstein had acted alone.184 Furthermore, the
Israeli government explicitly denounced his actions and declared his political party,185 Kach, to be an illegal, racist party in Israel.186 The Security
Council “strongly condemn[ed]” the “massacre” in Hebron and “call[ed]
upon” Israel to prevent these types of illegal acts.187 The Security Council
used the term “massacre” five times to describe the tragic incident.188
By contrast, in 2002, a Palestinian from the West Bank entered an
Israeli hotel during a Passover religious ceremony and set off a bomb.189
The explosion killed at least twenty-nine Jewish worshippers and injured an
additional 140 patrons in the Park Hotel.190 Hamas, a Palestinian political
party, explicitly claimed credit for the attack.191 The Security Council re181

See S.C. Res. 904, U.N. Doc. S/RES/904 (Mar. 18, 1994); S.C. Res. 1402, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1402 (Mar. 30, 2002).
182
LESCH, supra note 25, at 331.
183
David Weisburd & Hagit Lernau, What Prevented Violence in Jewish Settlements in the
Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip: Toward a Perspective of Normative Balance, 22 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 48 (2006). See also Clyde Haberman, Israel Panel Says Killer at Hebron
was Acting Alone, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1994, at A1. However, the Israeli army contends
only ninety were wounded. Id.
184
Id.
185
LESCH, supra note 25, at 331.
186
See Weisburd & Lemau, supra note 182, at 48–49.
187
S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180.
188
Id.
189
Tracy Wilkinson, Attack in Israel Kills 19, Hurts 100; Violence: Palestinian Suicide
Bombing, the Deadliest in 10 Months, Could End Efforts for a Cease-fire and Unleash a New
Phase in the Conflict, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at A1.
190
John Ward Anderson & Molly Moore, 38 Hurt as Suicide Bomb Rocks Netanya Again,
WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2003, at A25. See also Greg Myre, A Passover Anniversary, Observed
by the Maimed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2003, at A3.
191
Wilkinson, supra note 188, at A1; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ERASED IN A MOMENT:
SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI CIVILIANS 146 (2002).
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sponded with a resolution that “express[ed] its grave concern” about both
the suicide bombing and Israel’s attacks against the Palestinian Authority.192
It “call[ed] upon” Israel and the Palestinians to uphold a ceasefire and specifically “call[ed] for the withdrawal of Israel troops from Palestinian cities.”193
The differences in wording used by the Security Council in the two
resolutions are striking. Similar numbers of casualties and wounded worshippers were found in each incident, yet only Resolution 904 explicitly
“condemn[ed]” an attack and repeatedly used the term “massacre.”194 If
twenty-nine casualties and more than 125 wounded are defined as a “massacre” of Palestinian worshippers, should not the same hold true of Israeli
worshipers? Apparently it does not in the Security Council. The Council
“strongly condemn[ed]” the massacre in Hebron,195 yet it merely “call[ed]
upon” the parties to uphold a ceasefire and did not explicitly mention the
Park Hotel bombing or casualties incurred.196 Resolution 904 specifically
refers to the Palestinian civilian casualties four times in the resolution,197 but
Resolution 1402 does not mention Israeli civilians or casualties even
once.198 Additionally, Resolution 904 unambiguously characterizes the victims as “worshippers” killed “during the holy month of Ramadan,”199 which
clearly aligns the victims with the entire Islamic world. Resolution 1402
fails to mention who was killed by the “recent suicide bombings in Israel”
and completely omits that the Park Hotel bombing was perpetrated on unsuspecting worshippers celebrating Passover.200 A comparison of the explicit details and descriptions in Resolution 904 with the vague generalities in
Resolution 1402 clearly demonstrates the Security Council’s discrepant
treatment of the two similar Subjects.
Second, Resolution 904 declares the “massacre” resulted in “more
than 50 Palestinian civilians [deaths] and injured several hundred others.”201
These statistics are notably inaccurate. Numerous reports of the massacre
have capped the casualties at twenty-nine, with another 125 wounded.202
192

S.C. Res. 1402, supra note 180.
Id.
194
S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180.
195
Id.
196
S.C. Res. 1402, supra note 180.
197
S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180.
198
S.C. Res. 1402, supra note 180.
199
S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180.
200
S.C. Res. 1402, supra note 180.
201
S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180 (emphasis added).
202
Haberman, supra note 182, at A1. See also Weisburd & Lemau, supra note 182, at 48;
Scott Wilson, In Divided Hebron, a Shared Despair: Palestinians and Jewish Settlers in
West Bank City Struggle for Existence, WASH. POST, July 26, 2007, at A18.
193
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Nevertheless, when the Security Council addressed the Park Hotel bombing
in Resolution 1402, it neglected to include a single statistic or approximation of the Israeli victims. The extreme inflation of numbers in Resolution
904 compared to the complete absence of details in Resolution 1402 only
serves to emphasize the disparate word choices by the Security Council
when addressing Israel versus other Entities.
Finally, the Security Council fails to take into account the aftermath
of these tragic incidents. Following the “massacre” in Hebron, the Israeli
government immediately denounced the rogue citizen. Furthermore it took
measures to outlaw his fringe political party due to its radical ideologies.203
With respect to the Park Hotel bombing, the suicide bomber’s political party, Hamas, not only failed to chastise the brutal attack, but it proudly
claimed credit for killing and maiming Israelis. The Security Council ignored these distinctions between the two attacks, further proving that even
when Subjects are virtually identical, if Israel is one of the Entities, it will
be treated differently.
2.

Precise numbers and civilians

The differences evident in Security Council Resolution 904 and
Resolution 1402—one that includes detailed, inaccurate numbers and the
other mere vague generalities—is not isolated to these two tragic incidents.
The Security Council repeatedly uses remarkable detail in discussing the
actions Israel has exacted upon other Entities. In at least eight resolutions,
the Security Council has declared the precise number of people killed, deported or injured by Israel.204 These eight resolutions do not even include
the additional resolutions that use detailed, but inexact amounts, such as
“hundreds,”205 “unknown number of deaths and destruction,”206 or “a high
number of deaths and injuries.”207 Moreover, the term “Palestinian civilian”
has been used thirty-three times in Security Council resolutions to describe
the people being subjected to inappropriate actions.208 Not a single time in
1794 Security Council resolutions has the Council used the specific term
203

See Weisburd & Lemau, supra note 182, at 49 n.42 (quoting Samuel C. Heilman,
Guides of the Faithful: Contemporary Religious Zionist Rabbis, in SPOKESMEN FOR THE
DESPISED: FUNDAMENTALIST LEADERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST 328, 355–356 (R. Scott Appleby
ed., 1997)).
204
S.C. Res. 1322, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322 (Oct. 7, 2000); S.C. Res. 904, supra note 180;
S.C. Res. 726, U.N. Doc. S/RES/726 (Jan. 6, 1992); S.C. Res. 694, U.N. Doc. S/RES/694
(May 24, 1991); S.C. Res. 681, supra note 25; S.C. Res. 672, supra note 111; S.C. Res. 641,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/641 (Aug. 30, 1989); S.C. Res. 636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/636 (July 6, 1989).
205
S.C. Res. 799, U.N. Doc. S/RES/799 (Dec. 18, 1992).
206
S.C. Res. 1405, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1405 (Apr. 19, 2002).
207
S.C. Res. 1073, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1073 (Sep. 28, 1996).
208
See, e.g., id.
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“Israeli civilian,” especially intriguing considering suicide bombers usually
target Israeli civilians.209
Outside the scope of the Middle East conflict, precise details or
numbers are extremely rare. For example, the Security Council first considered South Africa’s apartheid practices in 1960 when sixty-nine unarmed
African protestors were killed by the government and another two hundred
were injured, in what is known as the “Sharpeville incident.”210 The casualties and wounded protestors were well documented and resulted in a complaint to the Security Council by twenty-nine Members.211 Even with clear
documentation and the outrage of so many Members, Security Council Resolution 134 failed to use any specific details in describing the tragic incident.212 Instead, the Council described the Sharpeville incident as “largescale killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination.”213 This serves as another example that, even amongst pariah
states,214 the Security Council does not treat all Members equally.
3.

Black September, al-Anfal, and the West Bank

The Security Council’s issuance of resolutions against Israel for actions it would ignore if made by another Entity can be verified by examining the treatment of other Middle Eastern countries in the Cold War era,
specifically Jordan and Iraq. In September of 1970, King Hussein of Jordan
sought to bolster his power over his people by eliminating the influence of
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and driving the group from
his country.215 Hussein treated “the PLO with extreme harshness, killing
thousands in two weeks.”216 Over three thousand were killed in the brutal
expulsion of the PLO.217 As a result of the King’s offensive, the PLO was

209

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 190, at passim. For a brief description of many
terrorist attacks since 2001, see Anti-Defamation League, Major Terrorist Attacks in Israel,
http://www.adl.org/Israel/israel_attacks.asp.
210
OZDEMIR A. OZGUR, APARTHEID: THE UNITED NATIONS & PEACEFUL CHANGE IN SOUTH
AFRICA 99 (1982); GORMAN, supra note 24, at 127.
211
S.C. Res. 134, U.N. Doc. S/RES/134 (Apr. 1, 1960).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
During the Cold War period, Israel and South Africa were often referred to as pariah
states in the international community. See Frits Kalshoven, Grotius: His Relevance to
Present Day Law of Armed Conflict, 77 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 212, 234 (1983).
215
ALEXANDER BLIGH, THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF KING HUSSEIN 138 (2002).
216
YAACOV LOZOWICK, RIGHT TO EXIST: A MORAL DEFENSE OF ISRAEL’S WARS 146 (Anchor Books 2004) (2003); see also EFRAIM KARSH, ARAFAT’S WAR 28 (2003) (declaring thousands dead and “horrendous atrocities” carried out).
217
LESCH, supra note 25, at 235.
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“crushed and driven out of Jordan”218 and the entire PLO infrastructure was
evicted by 1971.219 This tragic event is referred to as Black September.220
With the PLO no longer a factor, Hussein remained King until his death in
1999.221
Despite the well documented maltreatment of Palestinians living in
Jordan during Black September, the Security Council failed to issue a single
resolution or condemnation of the “horrendous atrocities.”222 Perhaps the
Security Council tacitly permitted these vicious actions due to America’s
Permanent Member veto. The United States invested quite a bit in King
Hussein’s control of Jordan. In fact, “Hussein’s moves during September
1970 were taken in concert with the US.” 223 Soon after Black September,
America intensified its military cooperation with the King and even stationed a CIA representative in Jordan’s capital.224 The fact that America
may have played a role in coordinating the King’s crackdown on his own
people—or at least giving him its tacit approval—may partially explain the
absence of any Security Council resolutions on this matter. Additionally, the
fact that the PLO was an organization that both encouraged and sponsored
worldwide terrorism surely played a role in the Council’s moral justification
of the persecution.225
In Iraq, the Security Council failed to chastise Saddam Hussein, or
even produce a single resolution, for the horrific al-Anfal campaign against
his own Iraqi citizens. From 1987 to 1988, Saddam’s forces used chemical
weapons to kill an estimated 182,000 Kurdish persons living in Iraq.226
Another 140,000 were forcefully removed from their homes.227 Although
Saddam was charged with genocide by the Iraqi High Tribunal two decades

218

LIBRARY OF CONG. FED. RESEARCH DIV., JORDAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 64 (Helen Chapin
Metz ed., 1991).
219
LESCH, supra note 25, at 236.
220
Id. at 235. The name of Jordan’s civil war should not be confused with the organization
“Black September” which was responsible for killing eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich
Olympics as well as numerous other plane hijackings. Id. at 238.
221
BLIGH, supra note 214, at 1.
222
KARSH, supra note 215, at 28.
223
BLIGH, supra note 214, at 141.
224
Id. at 142.
225
SCHOENBERG, supra note 15, at 31–33.
226
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Events Leading to the Creation of the IHT in SADDAM ON TRIAL
10 (Michael P. Scharf & Gregory S. McNeal eds., 2006) (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH &
PHYSICIANS, IRAQI KURDISTAN: THE DESTRUCTION OF KOREME DURING THE ANFAL
CAMPAIGN (1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE KURDS (1993)).
227
Id. (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ASSAULT ON THE MARSH
ARABS (2003)).
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after the carnage,228 the Security Council never addressed Saddam’s crimes
against humanity in a resolution. The United States never officially vetoed a
resolution chastising Saddam’s actions against his own people, but America
is, most likely, the reason for the absence of a Security Council resolution.
During the 1980s, the United States knowingly supplied Iraq with chemicals
to use against Iran in the war between those two countries.229 The United
States’ covert policy—providing Iraq with chemicals that could be used as
weapons in order to maintain the balance of fighting—was grounded in preventing both the destabilization of the entire Middle East and the flow of oil
to America.230 After Saddam used those same chemical weapons against his
own people, it is doubtful the United States would permit an international
condemnation of war crimes committed with the weapons America had
supplied.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Security Council has ignored these
horrific massacres, Israel has been repeatedly condemned and criticized for
killing and/or deporting Palestinians.231 Each occurrence for which Israel
has been denounced involved far less than the three thousand killed during
Black September or the 182,000 slaughtered in Iraq. Israel has been “deplored” for deporting “four Palestinians”232 and “five Palestinians.”233 It has
been “[s]trongly condemn[ed]” for deporting “twelve Palestinian[s]”234 and
“hundreds of Palestinian[s].”235 Israel was also “condemn[ed]” by the Security Council for violence “resulting in over twenty Palestinian deaths.”236
These statistics are not offered as a defense of Israel’s actions, but each of
these figures pale in comparison to the numbers attributed to Black September or the al-Anfal Campaign, yet only Israel is chastised in Security Council resolutions.

228

Paul von Zielbauer, Kurds Tell of Gas Attacks by Hussein’s Military, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 2006, at A10. Saddam was executed before the trial completed, but five co-defendants
were convicted, proving that the al-Anfal campaign was genocide. See John F. Burns, Hussein’s Cousin Sentenced to Die for Kurd Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, at A1.
229
Russ W. Baker, Iraqgate: The Big One That (Almost) Got Away, Who Chased It – and
Who Didn’t, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 48, 49–50; Michael Dobbs, U.S.
Had Key Role in Iraq Buildup: Trade in Chemical Arms Allowed Despite Their Use on Iranians, Kurds, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2002, at A1.
230
Baker, supra note 228, at 48; Dobbs, supra note 228, at A1.
231
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 450, U.N. Doc. S/RES/450 (June 14, 1979).
232
S.C. Res. 681, supra note 25.
233
S.C. Res. 641, supra note 203.
234
S.C. Res. 726, supra note 203.
235
S.C. Res. 799, supra note 204.
236
S.C. Res. 672, supra note 111, ¶¶ 1–2.
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South Africa: The other pariah state

While Israel was clearly the most commonly singled out Entity in
Security Council resolutions of the Cold War era, it was not the only one.
South Africa’s actions were the Subject of seventy-six Security Council
resolutions in the Cold War era.237 These resolutions concerned South Africa’s apartheid practices,238 or military attacks on other countries, such as
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, and Zambia.239 Apartheid was South Africa’s
“strict policy of racial separation and discrimination” by which the minority
white population controlled the government and the non-white majority.240
Although apartheid is a horrific subjugation of human rights that violates
the United Nations Charter,241 South Africa was excessively chastised compared with atrocities perpetrated by other Entities. Stanley Meisler, two time
winner of the Korn-Ferry Award for Excellence in United Nations Reports,
asserted that:
[t]he U.N. blathered on day after day about the terrible injustice of South
Africa but closed its eyes to horrors like the enervating civil war and the
legions of bloated Biafran babies in Nigeria, the blatant genocide of the
Hutus in Burundi, and the unabashed evil of a cunning and cruel Idi Amin
in Uganda. These blights were at least as terrible as that of South Africa.242

The Security Council’s failure to chastise these, as well as many
other, atrocities directly conflicts with the principle of equal treatment for
all Members, which was expressed in the introduction to the United Nations
Charter.

237

See, e.g., S.C. Res. 310, U.N. Doc. S/RES/310 (Feb. 4, 1972).
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 191, supra note 108.
239
Peter-Tobias Stoll, Conflicts, South Africa, in 1 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND
PRACTICE 317, 325 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 1995). See, e.g., S.C. Res. 300, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/300 (Oct. 12, 1971).
240
Stoll, supra note 238, at 317.
241
The Charter declares that there must be a “respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” U.N. Charter art.
1, para. 3.
242
MEISLER, supra note 46, at x.
238
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Not only did the Security Council excessively criticize South Africa, but it often used stronger words to criticize South Africa’s actions than
any other Entity, including Israel. South Africa was more vulnerable to
harsh denunciation and extensive focus because it lacked a staunch, Permanent Member ally on the Security Council willing to consistently veto resolutions regarding its transgressions. South Africa was passively supported
by WEOG, but “it never had such an indispensable ally as Israel did with
the United States.”243 In the Cold War era, South Africa was “condemn[ed]”
107 times.244 It was “condemn[ed]” more often than every other Entity
combined, including Israel.245
Other than Israel, which was
“condemn[ed]” thirty-seven times
in the Cold War era, no other
Entity was “condemn[ed]” more
than ten times. South Africa’s
apartheid policy and military attacks, as a Member of the United
Nations, were an obvious stain on
the United Nations as an organization; however, the astronomical
discrepancy of “condemn[ations]” by the Security Council shows that the
Council did not treat other Entities with equal attention or severity of wording.246
The Security Council “condemn[ations]” of South Africa were not
the only word choice that was used far more frequently for South Africa
than any other Entity. The Security Council “demand[ed]” an action from
South Africa seventy-seven times in the Cold War era.247 Often the “demands” required South Africa to withdraw forces from other territories,248
respect another country’s sovereignty,249 or make payment for damage to
other countries.250 Once again, many of these actions are indefensible and
243

Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Exclusion from Participation in International Organisations: The Law and Practice behind Member States’ Expulsion and Suspension of Membership in 5 STUDIES AND MATERIALS ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 224
(Peter Malanczuk ed., 2001) (citing Robert C. Johansen, The Reagan Administration and the
U.N.: The Costs of Unilateralism, 3 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL 601, 607–608 (1986)).
244
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 301, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/301 (Oct. 20, 1971).
245
South Africa was “condemn[ed]” 107 times and every other country combined was
“condemn[ed]” a total of eighty-nine times.
246
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should be criticized; however, the unambiguous inequality of usage of the
word “demand” in Security Council resolutions concerning South Africa is
too great to attribute merely to South Africa’s actions rather than unequal
treatment of Entities.
5.

Warnings: The domain of Israel and South Africa

During the Cold War era, at the United Nations, Israel and South
Africa were often “lumped” together.251 The Security Council almost exclusively reserved its “warn[ings]” for Israel and South Africa.252 The Security
Council repetitively “warn[ed]” each of the two countries that if military
attacks were repeated, the Council would consider further steps to enforce
its resolutions.253 In the Cold War era, Israel and South Africa were each
given five “warn[ings].” The only other Entity “warn[ed]” in this manner
was Portugal.254
Many other military attacks have failed to produce a “warn[ing]”
from the Security Council. On October 6, 1973, the holiest day of the year
for Israel, “Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack against Israel.”255
These military attacks never produced a “warn[ing]” from the Security
Council. When the Security Council considered Indonesia’s intervention in
East Timor in the 1970s, a conflict which resulted in more than 60,000
deaths,256 the Council did not “warn” Indonesia.257 During the Iran-Iraq War
of the 1980s, the Security Council failed to “warn” either country despite
repeated military attacks against each other’s civilian populations.258 Even
with ample records of numerous military attacks by many Entities other
than Israel and South Africa, the Security Council reserves its “warn[ings]”
for those two countries.
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Censure: Reserved for Israel

The Security Council has not used the word “censure” since the
Cold War era, and it has “censure[d]” an Entity only seven times in its history, yet Israel’s actions have been the Subject of five of those seven resolutions.259 Resolution 267 refers to Israel’s attempts to change the demographics of the population in Jerusalem and incorporate the newly occupied city
into Israel proper by administrative measures such as settlements.260 The
Security Council “[c]ensure[d] in the strongest terms all measures taken to
change the status of the City of Jerusalem.”261
However, in 1990, when Iraq destroyed Kuwaiti demographic
records and expelled Kuwaiti citizens from the region, the Security Council
failed to “censure” Iraq, instead it “[c]ondemn[ed]” the actions.262 The exile
of citizens in conjunction with destroying records of their habitation—along
with taking hostages and seizing property—are a far more devious combination of acts than transporting citizens into occupied lands because the former eliminates any prospect of reversal.
After examining the seven Security Council censures, it appears
that as a prerequisite, the Entity must have been previously chastised on the
same Subject. Since an Entity has already been, in effect, warned to stop its
actions, it follows that the Security Council can justify using the harsher
language and censure the Entity for repeating its actions. Israel satisfied the
precondition as it was previously instructed by the Security Council to cease
its efforts to change the legal status of Jerusalem through administrative
measures in Resolution 252.263
With respect to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and its appalling actions,
Resolution 674 was not the Security Council’s only condemnation of Iraq.
Only a month later, in Resolution 677, the Security Council reiterated its
criticism of Iraq’s actions, but it still did not increase the strength of the
wording to “censure;” instead, it merely “[c]ondemn[ed]” Iraq again.264
Iraq’s repeated disregard of Security Council resolutions satisfied the cru259
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cial element of previous chastisement on the Subject, yet a “censure” was
never invoked. These two situations, one involving Israel and the other Iraq,
are factually analogous enough to demonstrate that other Entities are not
criticized with the same language as Israel.
7.

Deplored: Israel more than every other country combined

Another word the Security Council used for Israel far more commonly than other Entities during the Cold War era is the word “deplore[d].”
Israel was “deplore[d]” forty times by the Security Council before 1990.265
The Entity “deplore[d]” the second most regularly during this time period
was South Africa, with eight occurrences.266 In fact, Israel alone was “deplore[d]” more often than every other Entity combined.267 Perhaps the Security Council has “deplore[d]” Israel so frequently because, although it is a
charged and scolding word, it is relatively weaker than other emotive words,
which may make it easier to get past the United States veto.268
Moreover, another reason Israel is “deplored” so often may be that
Israel’s policies in the West Bank and Gaza have created a bias in the Security Council that encourages the Council to “deplore” virtually any action by
Israel, even if that action would not be discussed if perpetrated by another
Entity.269 Israel has been “deplored” for a range of topics including the following: “lack of co-operation” with a United Nations security force,270 its
decision to prohibit the free travel of Mayor Fahd Qawasmeh,271 holding a
military parade in Jerusalem,272 refusing to receive the mission of the Secretary-General to the region,273 its military incursions,274 and failing to comply
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with previous Security Council resolutions.275 Other Entities are typically
“deplored” for casualties caused by military attacks,276 or rejecting prior
Security Council resolutions.277 While it is not evident that Israel being
“deplored” is in itself a more harsh word, it further buttresses the fact that
Israel is treated differently.
8.

Shocked: A comparison of assassinations

Another word the Security Council uses frequently in resolutions
regarding Israel is “shocked.”278 This word has only been used in eight resolutions in the history of the Security Council, but Israel’s actions were the
Subject of four of them.279 Most interesting is Security Council Resolution
471, which states that the Security Council is “[s]hocked by the assassination attempts against the Mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh.”280 On
June 5, 1980, three separate bombs injured two Arab mayors and an Israeli
soldier protecting another Arab mayor, but no one died in the attacks.281
Although the Israeli government played no role in the bombings and the
army tried to defuse one of the bombs, the Security Council voted fourteen
to zero, with an abstention from the United States, to condemn Israel for the
attacks.282
In responding to a different assassination attempt, this one made by
Ethiopians on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the Security Council
instead used the word “alarmed” to describe its feelings.283 Mubarak was
driving to the opening of the African summit meeting when the attackers
ambushed the motorcade with automatic weapons.284 Remarkably, Mubarak
was not injured in the attack.285 In Security Council Resolution 1044, Ethiopia was in no way blamed for the attack and Sudan was simply “call[ed]
upon” to extradite three suspects that it was harboring.286 The wording in
275
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Resolution 1044, although describing an attempt on a President rather than
just Mayors, was less severe than Resolution 471 regarding Israel.
Furthermore, when the Security Council addressed the assassinations of the Presidents of both Rwanda and Burundi in Resolution 912, the
Council used the same words as the attempted assassinations of the West
Bank mayors, “shocked.”287 On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal
Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira were flying
back from a regional summit when their plane was shot down by a rocket
while landing in Kigali, Rwanda.288 The Security Council stated it was
“[s]hocked at the tragic incident.”289 The assassins were not ascertained so
no specific Entity was the focus of “condemn[ation]” for the attack.290
Tying these three resolutions together, the Security Council has
used the same words to equate the non-state sponsored attempted assassinations of three mayors in lands controlled by Israel with the actual assassinations of two sitting African presidents. Furthermore, the Security Council
used harsher words to denounce the attempted mayoral assassination attributed to Israel than those used to denounce the assassination attempt on the
President of Egypt. The differences of the wording in Security Council resolutions for these three different Entities continue to prove that actions attributed to Israel, even if not carried out by Israel, are treated comparably
more severe.
9.

Confidence Building Measures: Not in the Middle East

The final area in which the Security Council has treated Israel and
South Africa differently than other Members or regions in conflict is by use
of the phrase “Confidence Building Measures” (CBMs). CBMs are actions
undertaken by each party in a conflict to “prevent or reduce the occurrence
of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions” that the other party will not abide by
agreements or follow through with their assurances.291 Distrusting adversaries are unlikely to wholly capitulate to the demands of another without
guarantees it will be rewarded. CBMs are completed through a step-by-step
process which helps each side prove to its opponent that it is committed to
287
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establishing positive relations or repairing past harms. The Security Council
has gone so far as to explicitly articulate the individual steps involved in the
CBMs between certain parties.292
The Security Council has recommended CBMs ninety-four times to
a wide range of Entities.293 The peace reached in the Balkans was directly
attributable to CBMs. The Security Council seems to have experienced success with CBMs and continues to suggest them, except in the Middle East.
The Security Council has never suggested CBMs as a method to help resolve any Middle East conflict.294 In fact, CBMs are probably exactly what
the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict need. Several countries or mediators,
including the United States under George W. Bush, have suggested a stepby-step process through which Israel and the Palestinians can make slow,
but steady progress. Too often these suggestions have been ignored or
quickly discarded. However, if the United Nations Security Council put its
weight behind CBMs in the Middle East, it could not fail any more than
previous efforts. The fact the Security Council refuses to engage in using all
tools at its disposal, in order to help Israel and the Arab countries of the
Middle East achieve peace, exposes the Council’s divergent treatment of
Israel when compared to other Member countries.
C.

The Negroponte Doctrine

The Negroponte Doctrine is informally referenced often, yet rarely
discussed. This doctrine, named for Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations under President
George W. Bush, asserts that the United States demands Israel be given
equal treatment in the Security Council or America will use its ability to
veto unbalanced resolutions.295 The policy declared that as of October 6,
2003, the United States would require five principles in Security Council
resolutions where they are applicable:
1. A robust condemnation of acts of terrorism and all forms of incitement
to terrorism;
2. An explicit condemnation of . . . organizations responsible for acts of
terrorism;
292
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3. Call for dismantling the infrastructure, which supports these terror operations, wherever located, in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1373;
4. Call upon all parties to make a commitment to pursue a negotiated settlement;
5. A recognition that the issue of Israeli withdrawal . . . is connected to
an improvement in the security situation through reciprocal steps by the
Palestinians and Israelis, as called for by the Quartet.296

Negroponte explained, “[i]f you don't resist efforts to pass these
lopsided resolutions, it causes the Palestinians to feel they're let off the
hook. It vindicates their actions . . . . [E]verybody has a responsibility to
contribute to a peaceful solution to this conflict.”297 It appears the United
States developed this position after suffering the catastrophic terrorist attack
on September 11, 2001. After being attacked on such a grand scale for the
first time, more Americans understood the constant terrorist attacks Israel’s
civilians must endure, began to empathize with Israeli civilians, and identified with Israel’s policies geared towards preventing further attacks.298
This avowed policy of the Unites States government has significantly altered the dynamics of the Security Council. Israel is no longer chastised
as frequently or harshly as it was during the Cold War era and when it is
criticized, the resolutions are far more balanced. Since the Negroponte Doctrine went into effect,299 Israel has been criticized in only five resolutions.300
These five Security Council resolutions are far more balanced than any
resolution written before this time period because each resolution—at a
minimum—identifies Israel’s justification for taking the action that is being
chastised. For example, when the Security Council stated it was “[a]larmed
at the reoccupation of Palestinian cities” and “[d]emand[ed]” that Israel
withdraw those troops, it introduced the resolution by “[c]ondemning all

296
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terrorist attacks against any civilians, including the terrorist bombings in
Israel on 18 and 19 September 2002.”301
In staying true to the Negroponte Doctrine, when the wording of a
draft resolution is not balanced in the eyes of the United States, America
uses its veto. For example, in October of 2003, the United States vetoed a
Security Council resolution that would have declared Israel’s construction
of a barrier fence in the West Bank illegal.302 In explaining the reason for
the veto, although he was not required to, Negroponte stated that the resolution was not balanced because it did not include the reasons behind Israel’s
construction of the barrier, namely recurring terrorism and security problems.303 The Negroponte Doctrine has played a large role by affecting the
wording used by the Security Council in its recent resolutions and has
helped correct many of the Council’s deficiencies that led to unabashed and
persistent chastisement of Israel in the Cold War era.
The principles first expounded by John Negroponte have endured
well past the completion of his term as U.S. Permanent Representative to
the United Nations. Each of his successors has adhered to the Doctrine, although all successors were appointed by the Bush administration. Only time
will tell if the Negroponte Doctrine will survive the Bush administration,
whether in name or in practice. Bush’s successor, President Barack Obama
has not explicitly addressed the Negroponte doctrine. Throughout the presidential campaign, numerous groups have questioned Obama’s commitment
to Israel.304 Only time will tell if Obama will embrace the Negroponte Doctrine, but signals indicate he will fight for equality of all Members in the
United Nations. For example, in January 2008, the Security Council was
considering a resolution to denounce Israel for closing its border with Gaza.305 Obama, a senator at the time, wrote a letter to the Zalmay Khalilzad,
the U.S. Representative to the United Nations at the time, urging Khalilzad
to ensure the Security Council would either condemn the constant rocket
attacks emanating from Gaza or not pass a resolution at all.306 This powerful
and unsolicited letter suggests Obama’s commitment to equal treatment for
all in the United Nations.
301
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United Nations has clearly failed to live up to its obligation to
treat all countries equally in the Security Council. This Note has presented
concrete examples of the differences in word choices used in resolutions
concerning different Entities. The strong focus on Israel—and to a lesser
extent South Africa—was presented as evidence of the unequal treatment in
order to confront those that seek to ignore the biases against specific Entities.
The Negroponte Doctrine has artificially forced the Security Council to alter its methods regarding Israel; however, the Negroponte Doctrine
is merely a band-aid on a gunshot wound. It may temporarily alleviate some
of the immediate concerns, but it fails to fix the underlying problems that
foster unequal treatment amongst United Nations Members in the Security
Council. Biases only serve to politicize the Council and prevent it from
serving its purpose. While the Negroponte Doctrine has “fixed” the results,
it is merely another politicized bias trying to correct a more endemic antiIsrael disposition.
The Security Council should strive to eliminate the need for vetoes
or protection of allies; only then will it serve its intended purpose. In order
to permanently resolve its systemic problem, the Security Council must
undertake a complete reformation, including a fundamental rethinking of
how it should address threats to international peace and security. With regard to the linguistic choices made by the Security Council when considering resolutions, specific words should have more rigid definitions that are
applicable regardless of the Subject or Entity at issue. For example, perhaps
the Security Council should not use the word “alarmed” unless fatalities
were directly caused by an Entity’s action. While these categories should
not be absolutely formulaic—because circumstances may frequently play at
least some role—the Council should adopt distinct guidelines as to what
words should be used. Preconceived notions, stigmas, and biases should be
checked at the door to the Council’s chambers. Perhaps by reducing the
arrogance surrounding the Council, it can be de-politicized and, therefore,
resume its intended purpose to serve as the enforcer of international peace.
The purpose of this Note is to identify the discrepancies in Security
Council resolutions based on the Subject or Entity being discussed in order
to influence the Security Council to learn from its mistakes and biases of the
past in order to live up to the promise of its founders. This is the only way
the Security Council can “reaffirm [its] faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small . . . .”307
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